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Abstract 
This paper reveals the underlying dynamics between the capital buffer and bank 
performance in EU-27 countries. A dynamic panel analysis shows that capital buffer is 
significantly affected by bank performance and risk exposure. Remarkably, a threshold 
analysis identifies regime changes for the underlying relationships during the financial 
crisis of 2008. We find a positive relationship between the capital buffer and 
performance for banks that fall in the low performance regime, while a negative 
relationship is reported for the banks that belong to the high regime. Threshold results 
also show that buffer exerts a positive impact on bank performance. Although regulation 
reforms that aim to raise the capital requirements could improve bank performance and 
stability, these improvements are not homogeneous across banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Capital buffer; Dynamic threshold; Performance; Bank default risk. 
JEL classification: G20; G21; G28 
aSchool of Business, Management and Economics, Jubilee Building, University of Sussex, 
Falmer, BN1 9SL, UK, e-mail: e.mamatzakis@sussex.ac.uk,  
bSchool of Business, Management and Economics, Jubilee Building, University of Sussex, 
Falmer, BN1 9SL, UK, e-mail: a.bagntasarian@sussex.ac.uk 
2 
  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008 shows that sudden changes in asset quality and value can 
quickly diminish bank capital, leaving banks with inadequate capital to deal with 
unexpected losses. As a result, capital buffer requirements have become an instrument 
of providing cushion during adverse economic conditions. In some respect, capital 
buffer is a macro-prudential tool that could prevent bank excessive risk-taking (Ayuso 
et al. 2004; Jokipii and Milne 2008). Under Basel III, banks need to maintain a 
mandatory capital buffer of 2.5 percent of common equity. In the case of violation of 
this minimum requirement, the Basel Committee would assert restrictions on dividends 
and remunerations. Furthermore, Basel Committee may also require a discretionary 
counter-cyclical buffer up to another 2.5 percent of capital during periods when funds 
are easy to borrow. The main aim of counter-cyclical buffer is to prevent market 
instability during periods of excessive credit growth by providing banks with extra 
capital (Krug et al. 2015). Banks also have an incentive to hold capital buffer in order 
to signal soundness and thereby, receive higher credit rating scores. In addition, banks 
may hold a capital buffer to avoid costs related to penalties and restrictions imposed by 
the regulators when the former violate minimum capital requirements (Buser et al. 1981; 
Jokipii and Milne 2011). Finally, there is a vast literature on examining the association 
between capital requirements and bank’s asset structure (Alali and Jaggi 2011; Chu et 
al. 2007; Furfine 2001; Pasiouras et al. 2006; Repullo and Suarez 2012; Rime, 2001; 
Shrieves and Dahl, 1992). Since regulators imply restrictions on banks to limit their risk 
exposure, it could be the case that banks with a higher risk exposure might maintain a 
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higher capital buffer (Baule 2014; Calomiris and Wilson 2004; Flannery and Rangan 
2008; Jokipii and Milne 2008, 2011). 
Despite the benefits of financial stability due to the adequate capital buffer, some 
literature argues that raising capital through capital markets is costly especially during 
economic downturns (Alfon et al. 2004; Ayuso et al. 2004; Berger and Bonaccorsi di 
Patti 2006). Banks might rely on their own profitability to build up a capital buffer 
(Shim 2013). To this day, there is not a clear consensus in the literature on the 
relationship between the capital buffer and bank performance. There are studies that 
provide evidence for a negative association between bank performance and capital 
buffer (Alfon et al. 2004; Ayuso et al. 2004; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 2006; Jokipii 
and Milne 2008) suggesting that strong bank performance substitutes for capital as a 
cushion against unexpected losses. Another strand of literature (Berger 1995, Flannery 
and Rangan, 2008; Nier and Bauman 2006; Shim 2013) finds a positive relationship 
between performance and buffer indicating that an improvement in bank performance 
increases buffer.  
Concerning the capital buffer and risk nexus, there are several empirical studies (Baule 
2014; Calomiris and Wilson 2004; Flannery and Rangan 2008; Francis and Osborne 
2012; Jokipii and Milne 2008; Shim 2013) testing whether increasing the risk taken by 
banks force them to maintain a higher capital buffer. The results show that there is a 
positive relationship between bank risk-taking and capital buffer, indicating that banks 
with a greater risk exposure choose to hold a higher capital buffer. Following previous 
literature (Ayuso et al. 2004; Jokipii and Milne 2008), we employ non-performing loans, 
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off-balance-sheet items and risk-weighted assets to account for bank risk exposure, 
while as a measure of bank default risk we include Altman’s Z-Score (Altman 1968). 
This paper contributes to the literature of the relationship between capital buffer, bank 
performance and risk in several ways. First of all, unlike previous studies, this paper 
employs a dynamic panel threshold analysis. Similarly to the conventional dynamic 
panel analysis, threshold methodology accounts for the dynamic nature of capital buffer 
and for the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. The main advantage of 
the threshold analysis over dynamic panel regressions is that it allows data itself to 
define the crisis years. Thus, threshold analysis identifies the presence of regime 
switches in the relationship between the capital buffer and other bank-specific variables. 
Specifically, we investigate the presence of regime switches for the relationship 
between a) capital buffer and performance as measured by bank efficiency and b) capital 
buffer and risk of default as measured by Altman’s Z-Score. Furthermore, we account 
for the inverse relationship between these variables. For this reason, we examine the 
impact of capital buffer on bank performance and Altman’s Z-Score using buffer as a 
threshold variable.  Additionally, we opt for different measures of performance and risk 
to reveal all potential determinants of bank capital buffer. Finally, this study covers a 
period (2004 – 2013) that includes the crisis years and therefore, we take into account 
any differences due to the financial meltdown in 2007 – 2008 and the recovery thereafter.   
This study confirms prior research, suggesting that bank performance and risk have a 
strong impact on the capital buffer. However, this analysis shows that the impact of 
efficiency on buffer varies across banks.  Estimated results demonstrate a strong 
positive impact of performance on the buffer for banks in the low performance regime, 
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while for the relatively better performing banks a further improvement in performance 
would reduce capital buffer. Furthermore, we show that capital buffer would reduce 
bank risk of default. We also perform a sensitivity analysis to account for any potential 
endogeneity and therefore, underlying causality, opting for a flexible panel VAR model. 
This model provides the response of bank capital buffer to shocks in efficiency and risk 
of default in the VAR. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets the hypotheses to be tested in the 
empirical section. Section 3 presents our data, whilst section 4 discusses the 
methodology. Next, section 5 reports regression results and the subsequent threshold 
analysis. Section 6 develops our sensitivity analysis employing Panel-VAR 
methodology and finally, section 7 concludes. 
2. Hypotheses development 
2.1.The dynamic adjustment hypothesis 
Following previous literature (Ayuso et al. 2004; Guidara et al. 2013; Jokipii and Milne 
2008, 2011; Stolz and Wedow 2011), we hypothesise that banks might need time to 
adjust their capital buffer. In the absence of adjustment costs in capital ratio, banks 
would not hold capital in excess of the minimum regulatory requirement (Stolz and 
Wedow 2011). As banks would adjust the capital buffer with some time lags, the capital 
buffer of the previous period should have a positive and statistically significant impact 
on the current capital buffer. 
H1. Adjustment in bank capital would affect positively the capital buffer.  
2.2. Bank performance hypothesis. 
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Past research (Alfon 2004; Ayuso et al. 2004; Guidara et al. 2013; Jokipii and Milne 
2008; Nier and Baumann 2006; Rime 2001; Shim 2013) provides mixed results 
regarding the relationship between bank capital buffer and performance. Alfon (2004), 
Ayuso et al. (2004), Guidara et al. (2013) and  Jokipii and Milne (2008) find a negative 
relationship between capital and ROE. Berger (1995), Flannery and Rangan (2008), 
Nier and Baumann (2006), Rime (2001) and Shim (2013) provide evidence of a positive 
relationship between bank profitability and capital buffer, indicating that more 
profitable banks hold a higher capital buffer. This strand of literature is in line with the 
pecking order theory, according to which banks prefer retained earnings as their main 
source of financing since external sources can be costly (Myers and Majluf 1984).  
In this study, beyond the accounting measures of bank performance such as return on 
equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) and net interest margin (NIM), we also employ 
bank’s cost efficiency derived from the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Although, 
there have been several studies about the link between total regulatory capital and 
efficiency, up till now the literature on the relationship between the capital buffer and 
efficiency has been rather inconclusive. In an early study, Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) 
using quarterly data over the period 1986 – 1995 for 352 U.S. bank holding companies, 
examine the relationships among bank risk-taking, capital and efficiency. The authors 
document a positive relationship between inefficiency and capital providing evidence 
of regulatory pressure over underperforming banks to maintain more capital. Moreover, 
the authors show that better capitalized banks exhibit a higher level of efficiency than 
less capitalized banks. 
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Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) find a negative relationship between regulatory 
capital and efficiency for U.S. banks over the period 1990 – 1995. Their results support 
the “efficient-risk hypothesis” which suggests that more efficient institutions would 
hold relatively low capital, since higher expected returns from the greater efficiency 
may substitute capital. 
In line with these results, Altunbas et al. (2007) using a sample of European banks for 
the period 1992 – 2000, show that inefficient European banks tend to hold more capital 
and evolve in less risky activities. 1  These results provide further support for the 
regulatory pressure over underperforming banks to maintain more capital. However, 
Altunbas et al. (2007) argue that this relationship varies with the level of bank efficiency 
and across ownership types.  
Arguably, the opposite relationship might also exist supporting the “franchise-value 
hypothesis” (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 2006). According to the “franchise-value 
hypothesis”, more efficient institutions tend to maintain a relatively high capital to 
protect their franchise value and future income derived from high efficiency (Berger 
and Bonaccorsi di Patti 2006; Kwan and Eisenbeis 1997). This hypothesis could also be 
reinforced by the pecking order theory according to which banks will prefer to finance 
their capital needs internally, especially when the access to capital markets is difficult. 
Therefore, more efficient banks that are expected to be more profitable (Althanasoglou 
et al. 2008; Berger et al. 1997; Goddard et al. 2009; Oral and Yolalan 1990), may hold 
greater capital buffer. 
                                                             
1 Altunbas et al. (2007) measure bank capital as the ratio of equity over total assets. 
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Thus, since a further analysis is warranted to determine the relationship between capital 
buffer and bank performance, our second hypothesis is developed as follows: 
H2. Bank performance enhances bank capital buffer. 
2.3.Bank risk exposure hypothesis 
During the last decade, regulators have emphasized the importance of capital 
requirements in order to mitigate risk-taking and enhance the financial stability of the 
banking industry. The implementation of higher capital requirements aims to create a 
direct link between banks’ capital and risk. It could be the case that banks with a greater 
risk exposure may have to maintain a higher level of capital (Nier and Baumann 2006). 
In line with this view, prior literature (Calomiris and Wilson 2004; Flannery and Rangan 
2008; Jokipii and Milne 2008, 2011; Rime 2001; Shrieves and Dahl 1992) find a 
positive relationship between bank capital buffer and risk, indicating that banks with 
risky positions hold higher buffers. This strand of literature provides evidence 
supporting the “regulatory hypothesis” according to which regulators encourage banks 
with a higher risk exposure to hold a higher capital buffer. The reason is that banks that 
hold risky portfolios but do not maintain a higher buffer are more likely to end up with 
capital below the minimum requirement.  
On the other hand, the “moral hazard hypothesis” proposes a negative relationship 
between capital and risk. According to this hypothesis, banks might exploit flat-rate 
deposit insurance schemes (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 2002).2 It could be the case that 
                                                             
2 Consistent with this theory, Jacques and Nigro (1997) document a negative association between changes 
in capital and risk during the first year of the risk-based standards. The authors note that such a result 
might be due to the methodological issues in the risk-based guidelines where the weights assigned to 
assets classes might not reflect the true risk. 
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banks with greater risk exposure may hold lower capital buffer if all depositors are 
insured.3  
As the literature it is not conclusive, we test the following hypothesis: 
H3. Risk exerts a positive impact on bank capital buffer. 
3. Data and variables 
We use an unbalanced bank-level panel data that includes saving and commercial banks 
from EU-27 countries over the period 2004 – 2013 on annual basis.4 Our analysis uses 
1,017 banks and a total of 3,788 observations. The primary source of our data is the 
Bankscope database by Bureau van Dijk, while we obtain macroeconomic data from 
the World Bank.  
3.1.Measuring bank capital buffer 
We define the capital buffer as the amount of capital banks hold in excess of the 
minimum requirement (Ayuso et al. 2004; Guidara et al. 2013; Jokipii and Milne 2008, 
2011). Table 1 and Figure 1 present the variability of total regulatory capital (Tier 1 
plus Tier 2 over Risk Weighted Assets) across country and over time respectively. 
Following Jokipii and Milne (2008), the calculation of minimum capital requirement 
                                                             
3 In line with this theory, Baumann and Nier (2003) employing a sample of listed banks across 32 
countries for the period between 1993 and 2000, find that banks located in countries with greater 
government support and deposit insurance hold lower capital buffer. 
4 In our sample, we include both saving and commercial banks following the study of Casu and Girardone (2010). 
The authors suggest that mainly commercial and saving banks in European Union form depositary institutions and 
they have a sufficient degree of cross-country homogeneity and comparability. Previous studies that include both 
saving and commercial banks in their analysis are  Gropp et al. (2010) and Kalyvas and Mamatzakis (2014). In order 
to account for any differences in the business model between saving and commercial banks, most of these studies 
employ a dummy variable. In line with these studies, we also include a dummy variable for commercial banks (COM).    
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for each country is based on Table 2 that presents the national total regulatory capital 
requirements. 
[Insert Table 1, Figure 1 and Table 2] 
Table 3 and Figure 2 report descriptive statistics for capital buffer across countries and 
over time respectively. Data for the years 2004 – 2013 shows that banks hold far more 
capital than required by the regulators. Banks with the highest mean capital buffer are 
located in north Europe such as Belgium and Austria (15.35 and 14.59 respectively), 
while banks with the lowest capital buffer are in Germany (10.89), Croatia (10.92) and 
Sweden (10.98). The average capital buffer across EU-27 is 11.75. As regards the 
evolution of buffer over time, we should note that for the period between 2004 and 2006 
there is a negative trend (see Figure 2). However, buffer shows a positive development 
during the period between 2006 and 2010. For the years 2010-2012, the decreasing 
buffer suggests that European banks had difficulties in maintaining a high capital due 
to the financial crisis (Avramidis and Pasiouras 2015).  
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 2] 
3.2.  Measuring bank cost efficiency. 
Bank efficiency has been widely used in previous research to examine the impact of 
managerial structure, such as ownership and compensation, on efficiency (Dong et al. 
2016; Tzeremes 2015) and to investigate the effects of regulation on bank efficiency 
(Kalyvas and Mamatzakis 2014; Liu et al. 2012; Pasiouras 2008). Another strand of 
literature has examined the impact of systematic differences across banks, such as size 
and risk, on efficiency (Berger and Humphrey 1997; Mamatzakis 2015; Sharma et al 
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2015), while the association between bank efficiency and market performance has also 
been investigated (Beccalli et al. 2006; Hadad et al. 2011). In this paper, we derive cost 
efficiency from a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). This methodology combines the 
random error and efficiency in one composite error term (Berger and Humphrey 1997). 
The cost efficiency model for SFA is the following: 
!"#,% = '()#,%, *#,% , +#,%, ,-,%. +	1#,% + 	2#,%                                                                              (1a) 
where !"#,% stands for the total cost of bank i at year t, )#,% is a vector of inputsand *#,% 
is a vector of outputs. +#,%  is a vector of quasi-fixed netputs while the vector 	,-,% 
represents country-specific variables. As regards	1#,%, this term represents factors that 
affect the total cost function but are beyond the control of the managers. Finally, 2#,% 
stands for the bank inefficiency that is controlled by the managers and follows a half-
normal distribution. The cost efficiency scores lie between 0 and 1 and are calculated 
according to the below formula: 
 344#,% = 5exp(−2#,%.: − 1	                                                                                      (1b) 
To enhance flexibility, we resort to the translog cost specification: 
<=!"#,% = 	 >? +	∑ >#<=)#,% +	∑ A#<=*#,% +	# 	BC ∑ ∑ >#<=)#,%<=)D,%D +##	BC ∑ ∑ A#<=*#,%<=*D,%D + 	∑ ∑ E#,D<=)#,%<=*D,%D +	# 	∑ F<=+#,% +##		BC ∑ ∑ F#<=+#,%<=+D,%D +	# 		 BC∑ ∑ G#,D<=)#,%<=+D,%D + 	∑ ∑ H#,D<=*#,%<=+D,%D +##	IB!C +	∑ J#!<=)#,% +	# ∑ F#!<=*#,% +	# ∑ K#!<=+#,% +	# 	 	∑ L#M-,% + 	1#,% +#2#,%	                                                                                                               (2) 
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Bank inputs and outputs are defined based on the intermediation methodology (Sealey 
and Lindley 1977). According to this methodology, the main purpose of banks is to use 
their labour and capital to accumulate funds and to transform them into loans and other 
income generating assets. We specify two inputs and two outputs. Inputs consist of 
labour as measured by the ratio of personnel expenses over total assets (P1) and 
financial capital measured as the ratio of total interest expenses over deposits and short-
term funding (P2). In terms of output prices, we include gross loans (Y1) and other 
earning assets (Y2) such as T-bills, bonds, government securities and equity investments. 
Total cost (TC) is defined as the sum of total interest and non-interest expenses. 
We include as quasi-fixed netput the fixed assets of each bank (N1) which stands for a 
proxy of physical capital. Furthermore, we include equity (N2) as a second qausi-fixed 
netput. Equity represents an alternative source of funding for banks and therefore, it 
might affect their cost structure (Fiordelisi et al. 2011).  
Furthermore, the translog function includes the time trend (T) to account for 
technological progress and any potential time effects. Finally, we include country-
specific dummy variables (,-,%), to capture country characteristics and cross-country 
differences. 
The variability in bank cost efficiency across country and over time is reported in Table 
4 and Figure 3 respectively. Table 4 shows that the average cost efficiency for the 
sample is around 78%. This indicates that banks need to improve their efficiency by 22% 
in order to converge to the cost efficiency frontier. At a country level, Hungary, 
Romania and Bulgaria have the lowest cost efficiency scores with scores of 0.63, 0.63 
and 0.64 respectively. Conversely, banks in Malta, Spain and Sweden are the best 
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performers with efficiency scores around 0.85, 0.84 and 0.83 respectively. These scores 
could be compared to the efficiency scores reported in the previous literature (Casu and 
Girardone 2010; Kalyvas and Mamatzakis 2014). 
Concerning the evolution of bank efficiency over time, Figure 3 indicates an apparent 
reduction in cost efficiency during the years 2005 – 2008 with the lowest score in 2008 
(0.73). The next two years are characterized by a positive trend (0.79 in 2009 to 0.81 in 
2010). After the year 2010, bank cost efficiency decreases possibly because most of the 
European banks are exposed to the sovereign debt crisis.  
[Insert Table 4 and Figure 3] 
Regarding the accounting performance measures, we include ROE that is the return to 
shareholders on their equity. Our next measure of bank performance is the ROA that 
reflects the ability of managers to generate profits using banks assets indicating how 
efficient bank assets are managed. Finally, we employ NIM, which focuses on the 
profits earned from interest activities.  
3.3. Measuring bank risk exposure 
In this study, we employ various proxies of bank risk exposure. First, we employ the 
Altman’s Z-Score (Altman 1968) as a measure of bankruptcy risk. The Altman’s risk 
measure is derived from balance sheet values and is calculated as follows: 
NO!PN+, = 1.2SB + 1.4SC + 3.3SV + 0.64SY + 0.999SY                                                   (3) 
where   SBis the ratio of working capital over total assets. Working capital is calculated 
as the difference between current assets and current liabilities. Positive values of 
working capital indicated that the institution can cover its financial obligations. SC is 
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the ratio of retained earnings over total assets and presents a measure of true profitability. SV  is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes over total assets. This measure 
reflects the cash available for allocation to shareholders, creditors and government. S[ 
is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of liabilities while SY stands for the 
ratio of sales to total assets and presents the sales generating ability of the bank. 
Therefore, a greater value of Altman’s Z-Score indicate a lower probability of 
bankruptcy.5 
As an additional measure of bank risk, we also consider an alternative of Altman’s Z-
Score. We employ ZSCORE as proposed by Boyd and Graham (1986) according to the 
following formula: ZSCORE = (1 + ROE) / Standard Deviation of ROE. This measure 
has been used widely in banking literature (Barry et al. 2011; Bouvatier et al. 2014; Guo 
et al. 2015; Lepetit and Strobel 2015; Mamatzakis and Bermpei 2014; Mare et al. 2016; 
Radic et al. 2012; Soedarmono et al. 2013). The ZSCORE can be interpreted as an 
accounting based measure of the distance to default and implies that banks with a lower 
Z-Score have a higher risk of default. 
Furthermore, we include the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans (NPL). We 
expect NPL to have a positive impact on bank capital buffer. Banks with increasing 
NPL will increase their capital buffer, as they are obligated to hold higher levels of loan 
loss provisions (Jokipii and Milne 2008). We also include the ratio of Off-Balance-
Sheet items over total liabilities (OBS) as another measure for bank risk. OBS items are 
measured as the non-interest income and fee-generating from various contingent 
liabilities such as derivatives, letters of credit, insurance and other types of non-
                                                             
5 For more details regarding the calculation of Altman’s Z-Score see Altman (1968). 
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traditional banking activities and securities underwriting. OBS items increase the risk 
exposure for a bank and therefore, we expect that banks with a greater amount of OBS 
items will hold higher a capital buffer.  Finally, we include the ratio of risk-weighted 
assets over total assets (RWA), defined as the total amount of bank’s assets weighted 
for the credit risk according to Basel rules. We consider RWA as a proxy of bank risk 
as the allocation of bank assets among risk categories would define the quality of bank 
portfolio risk. (Berger 1995; Jacques and Nigro 1997; Jokipii and Milne 2011).  Note 
that this measure of risk captures mainly bank’s exposure to the credit risk (Jokipii and 
Milne 2011).  
3.4. Other control variables 
As a measure of market discipline, we include a dummy variable DISCLSR that takes 
the value 1 for listed banks and 0 for unlisted. We expect that the observability of bank’s 
risk choices, as captured by this dummy variable, will increase the incentives for banks 
to hold regulatory capital above the minimum requirement. The main reasons are first, 
to reduce the risk of default and second to avoid being penalised by investors for 
choosing higher risk (Boot and Schmeits 2000; Nier and Baumann 2006). 
We also include the explanatory variable SIZE, measured as the natural log of total 
assets, to detect differences in the level of the capital buffer because of the bank size. 
Size may have an impact on capital buffer due to the extent of bank diversification, cost 
of funding and investment opportunities. This relationship could be either positive or 
negative depending on how small and large banks adjust their capital buffer during the 
period under study. Size may have a negative impact on capital buffer, as large and 
well-diversified banks have a smaller probability of a sharp decline in their capital ratios. 
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Moreover, smaller banks may increase their capital buffer in order to accommodate 
difficulties to access capital markets in case of emergency (Ayuso et al. 2004; Francis 
and Osborne 2012; Jokipii and Milne 2008). A positive relationship might also exist, in 
particular, due to the financial crisis of 2008. This positive relationship between bank 
size and buffer is in line with the “franchise-value hypothesis” according to which 
bigger banks may reinforce their charter value during difficult times by enhancing their 
capital. Thus, it could be the case that during the period under study, larger banks, 
compared to small banks, will take advantage of economies of scale, diversification 
effects and easier access to capital markets to increase their capital and comply with the 
minimum requirements.  
We also account for the concentration ratio (C5) in the banking industry by including 
the sum of the assets of the five largest banks as a share of all banks in each country and 
for each year. The impact of the concentration ratio on capital buffer could be either 
positive or negative. The sign depends on whether a low competition will increase or 
decrease the incentives for a higher capital (Nicoló et al. 2004).   
Furthermore, in order to eliminate the potential biases associated with having omitted 
variables, we employ a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for European Monetary 
Union countries and 0 otherwise (EMU). In addition, we include time dummies to 
capture any potential time effects and a dummy variable for commercial banks (COM) 
to account for any differences between commercial and saving banks (Casu and 
Girardone 2010). Table I in Appendix provides a brief description of the variables and 
the data sources, while Table 6 reports summary statistics for the key variables.  
[Insert Table I and Table 6] 
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4. Methodology 
4.1. Dynamic Panel Model 
Following previous studies (Ayuso et al. 2004; Jokipii and Milne 2008), we employ 
partial adjustment process in order to account for costs of adjustments in the capital 
buffer. We consider bank-specific variables and country-specific variables as 
determinants of the capital buffer as analysed in the data section. We apply the two-step 
system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator as developed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) for a dynamic model of panel data.6 This methodology is preferred 
for three main reasons. First, by taking the first differences for all variables, we 
eliminate the presence of any unobserved bank-specific effects. Second, we use the 
lagged dependent variable to capture the dynamic nature of capital buffer and third, by 
using GMM methodology, we account for the potential endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables. We consider as exogenous the country-specific variables and time dummies 
and as endogenous the bank-specific variables (Ayuso et al. 2004). The instruments 
chosen for the lagged endogenous variables are two-to-six period lags of the same 
variables. Furthermore, the results of the two-step system GMM estimator are tested by 
Hansen’s J diagnostic test for instrument validity and the test for the second-order 
autocorrelation of the error terms as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). Finally, 
we account for Windmeijer (2005) biased-corrected robust standard errors.  
                                                             
6 In this paper with use the xtbond2 stata command that implements the two-step system GMM estimator 
with the Windmeijer (2005) correction to the reported standard errors. In the one-step system GMM 
robust standard errors are reported which are robust to heteroscedasticity. In two-step GMM error terms 
are already robust and Windmeijer (2005) correction is implemented to standard errors. Two-step uses 
the consistent variance co-variance matrix from first step GMM to reconstruct the weight matrix. Without 
this correction, the standard errors tend to be downward biased. 
18 
  
 
 
The model that we examine is the following: 
\]44#,% = A? +	AB	\]44#,%^B +	AC	344#,% + 	AV	NO!PN+,#,% + 	A[	,_"`a3#,% +	AY+)O#,% + 	Ab	`\_#,% + 	AcadN#,% + 	Ae	fg_"`_]a3#,% + 	Ah_g,3#,% +	AB?"`P#,% + 	ABB"5#,% + ABCjf)ja#,% + klmn	n''nokp + 2#,%                                                                      
(4)                                                                   
where the lagged value of the dependent variable (\]44#,%^B)	captures the importance 
of adjustment costs and we expect a positive and significant coefficient for this variable 
as stated in the hypothesis H1. 	344#,%  stands for bank efficiency, 	NO!PN+,#,%  is 
Altman’s Z-Score calculated according to Altman (1968) and measures the bank’s risk 
for bankruptcy, 	,_"`a3#,%	is an additional measure bank risk presenting the distance 
from default. Other risk determinants that can affect bank capital buffer and we account 
for are +)O#,%  measured as the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets, 	`\_#,% 
which is the ratio of off-balance-sheet items to total liabilities and adN#,%  which stands 
for the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets.   
We also consider the impact of market discipline employing the variable 	fg_"`_]a3#,% that takes the value one for listed banks and 0 for unlisted.  _g,3#,%   
stands for bank size measured as the natural log of total assets. "`P#,% is an indicator 
variable that takes the value 1 for commercial banks and 0 otherwise, "5#,%  is the 
concentration ratio for the banking industry calculated as the sum of the assets of the 
five largest banks as a share of all banks in each country, jf)ja#,%  us the GDP growth 
in each country and 3P]#,% is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for European 
Monetary Union country and 0 otherwise. We also consider for time effects including a 
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set of time dummies to capture the unobserved time effects. The error term 2#,% consists 
of a bank-specific component	I#, which is assumed to be constant over time and a white 
noise s#,%. Hence, 2#,% = 	I# +	s#,% where I# ~ iid (o,σµ2) and s#,%	~ iid (o,σε2).  
4.2.  Dynamic panel threshold model  
Given the financial crisis of 2007 - 2008, we opt for a novel methodology that enables 
us to identify any potential regime changes in the relationship between capital buffer, 
bank performance and risk-taking. We employ the threshold methodology proposed by 
Hansen (1999) and developed by Kremer et al. (2013). This methodology uses the cross-
sectional model employed by Caner and Hansen (2004), where the authors allow for 
endogeneity by using GMM estimators. Kremer et al. (2013) extended threshold 
analysis to a dynamic unbalanced methodology that identifies possible changes in the 
coefficient of the independent variables. 
We employ the following threshold model: 
\]44#,% = 	 I# +	tBm#,%	g(S#,% ≤ v. + EBg(S#,% ≤ v. +	tCm#,%g	(S#,% > v. +	s#,%     (5) 
The subscript i refers to the individual banks and the subscript t indexes the time. \]44#,% is the dependent variable, I# is the bank-specific fixed effect and tB and tC the 
reverse regression slopes and based on these slopes we assume two regimes. S#,% is the 
threshold variable and  v is the threshold value, which distribute the observations above 
and below the threshold value composing the high and low regimes respectively. g is 
the indicator function that specifies the two regimes as defined by the threshold variable. 
Finally, s#,%  is the error term, which is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed (iid) with mean zero and finite variance σ2. The model employed by Kremer 
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et al. (2013) treats m#,% as a vector of explanatory variables that includes a subset m1#,% 
of exogenous variables uncorrelated with s#,%  and a subset m2#,%  of endogenous 
variables correlated with s#,%. Furthermore, Kremer et al. (2013) extend Hansen’s (1999) 
work by accounting for the regime dependent variable EB which represents the 
differences in the regime intercepts. According to Bick (2010), we include EB	 as 
disregarding the regime intercepts would lead to biased estimates for both the regime 
coefficients and the threshold value.  
In the first step, in order to estimate the predicted values, Kremer et al. (2013) following 
Caner and Hansen (2004) uses the reduced form of regressions for the endogenous 
variable as a function of instruments. In step two, the threshold value γ is estimated by 
using the predicted values of the endogenous variables in Eq. (5). In the third step, to 
obtain the slope parameters tB and tC, Eq. (5) is estimated via GMM for the threshold 
value γ, where the threshold variable is replaced by its predicted values calculated in the 
second step.  According to Caner and Hansen (2004), the optimal threshold is estimated 
via a minimizer of the sum of squared errors by using 2SLS estimator.  Following Caner 
and Hansen  (2004) and Hansen (1999), the 95% confidence interval of the threshold 
value is given by the Γ = [γ: LR(γ) ≤ C(α)]. Here, C(α) indicates the asymptotic 
distribution of the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic at 95% significance level.  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1.Panel regression  results 
We first propose to examine the association between capital buffer, performance and 
risk employing dynamic panel regressions for the model specified in equation (4). We 
start our analysis with this methodology to capture the dynamic nature of capital buffer 
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and to account for the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Besides the 
dynamic panel analysis, we propose a threshold methodology that identifies potential 
regime switches in the underlying relationships, while at the same time it maintains all 
the advantages of the dynamic panel analysis as discussed previously.  Therefore, our 
main motivation for the use of the threshold analysis is to identify any changes in the 
relationships between the variables because of the financial crisis of 2008.  
Dynamic panel results are presented in Table 6 and 7. In Table 6, we use the cost 
efficiency as a performance measure. We add the control variables gradually to see the 
individual impact of the main variables. Model (3) includes ALTMANZ as the main 
measure of bank risk, while in Model (4) we use ZSCORE as part of sensitivity analysis 
of an alternative bank risk measure. Next, in Models (5) - (7) we employ NPL, OBS 
and RWA variables respectively. Finally, Model (8) accounts for all bank and country-
specific variables simultaneously. The cost of adjustment as captured by the coefficient 
of the lagged dependent variable \]44#,%^B  is positive and highly significant in all 
specifications. These results confirm hypothesis H1 suggesting that banks need time to 
adjust their current capital buffer. The coefficient of  \]44#,%^B  changes across different 
models when we include other control variables. Adding all bank and country-specific 
variables in Model (8), the speed of adjustment increases from 0.188 in Model (1) to 
0.572 in Model (8). The speed of adjustment of 0.572 in Model (8) indicates that when 
we account for other determinants of bank capital buffer, banks converge to the target 
buffer with a rate of 57.2% per annum.  
In terms of regression estimates, the coefficient of cost efficiency (EFF) is positive and 
significant at 1% level (see Models (2) and (7)). In Model (8) which includes all control 
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variables, EFF exerts a positive impact on bank capital buffer at 5% level. These results 
are in line with our second hypothesis H2 indicating that higher efficiency leads to a 
greater capital accumulation (Fiordelisi et al. 2011). This finding is in agreement with 
the pecking order theory which argues that institutions prefer to use internal sources of 
funding rather than external sources (Myers and Majluf 1984). Furthermore, this 
positive relationship between bank efficiency and capital buffer could be explained by 
the “franchise-value hypothesis” according to which due to the income effect of high 
cost efficiency, banks will choose to hold a higher capital to protect their reputation and 
charter value (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 2006). 7 
As regards the impact of bank risk measures on capital buffer, ALTMANZ carries a 
positive and highly significant coefficient in Model (3) and Model (8). This positive 
relation between ALTMANZ and BUFF suggests that banks that are less likely to 
default (lower risk) hold a greater capital buffer. Note that this relationship is significant 
at 1% in Model (8). These findings reinforce the “franchise-value hypothesis”. Stable 
banks with a lower risk of default have higher charter value (Jokipii and Milne 2011) 
and therefore, banks with high Z-Score will sustain their value by maintaining a higher 
capital buffer.  
The OBS variable exerts a positive impact on bank capital buffer at 10% level in Models 
(6) and (8) providing evidence for hypothesis H3 and supports the “regulatory 
hypothesis” according to which banks with greater off-balance sheet activities prefer to 
hold higher capital buffer as a cushion against unexpected losses. We also report a 
                                                             
7 Franchise or charter value of a bank is defined as the value that would be foregone due to a bankruptcy. According 
to this theory there is ambiguous relationship between bank capital and risk taking. The higher risk can increase the 
probability of default and therefore encourage banks to raise their capital. This has been broadly discussed by Boot 
and Schmeits (2000). 
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positive and at 1% level significant coefficient for the bank size. Existing literature 
(Ayso et al. 2004; Guidara et al. 2013; Jokipii and Milne 2008; Stolz and Wedow 2011) 
provide evidence for the too-big-to-fail phenomenon according to which larger banks 
expect government support in an event of distress and thereby might keep lower capital 
buffer. Furthermore, according to this strand of literature, larger banks benefit from 
economies of scale and diversification effects. Therefore, larger banks have easier 
access to capital markets and a lower probability of a sharp drop in their capital ratios. 
In contrast, small banks might need to maintain a greater capital buffer to deal with 
difficulties to draw on capital markets. In this study, which covers the years of the 
financial meltdown of 2007 – 2008, we report results that are in line with the “franchise-
value hypothesis”. Thus, larger institutions would protect their sustainability during 
difficult periods by ensuring their capital adequacy.8    
All models pass the Hansen standard validity tests of the instruments used in the 
regressions. Moreover, AR(2) p-values reject the presence of second-order correlation 
in the error terms, as should be if the residuals in levels are white noise. 
[Insert Table 6] 
In a further analysis, we use dynamic panel regressions to examine the relationship 
between capital buffer and performance. Model (1) in Table 7 employs bank efficiency, 
Model (2) uses the ROE as an indicator of bank profitability, Model (3) examines the 
relationship between the capital buffer and ROA while Model (4) includes NIM.  
                                                             
8 Banks that violate the minimum capital requirements lose part of their charter value (Flannery and 
Rangan 2004; Stolz and Wedow 2011). Thus, larger banks will take advantage of the economies of scale, 
diversification effects and the easier access to capital markets to maintain a higher capital buffer. 
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Models (5) - (7) report the simultaneous impact of the efficiency and one of the other 
performance measures on buffer.  
Model (2) documents a positive relationship between ROE and capital buffer at 1% 
level. Consistent with the impact of EFF on buffer in Table (6), this result provides 
further evidence for both the “franchise-value hypothesis” and the pecking order theory. 
Therefore, more profitable banks that accumulate equity through retained earnings, may 
hold greater capital buffer, especially when raising capital is difficult. Arguably, less 
profitable banks suffering from a greater cost of issuing equity might maintain a lower 
capital buffer. These results could be compared with those obtained from Nier and 
Baumann (2006) who suggest that ROE can enhance capital buffer. Similar results 
documenting a positive relationship between profitability and capital have been found 
in Berger (1995) and Flannery and Rangan (2008) for the 1980s and 1090s 
respectively.9  
As regards the impact of the other control variables on buffer, after employing ROE as 
a performance measure, ALTMANZ and SIZE maintain their positive and highly 
significant impact on buffer. The significant coefficient of ALTMANZ indicates that 
even when we account for bank performance with ROE, lower likelihood of bankruptcy 
leads to higher capital buffer. The positive coefficients of NPL and OBS in Models (4) 
– (7) provide evidence in favour our hypothesis H3 for a positive relationship between 
risk and capital buffer supporting the “regulatory hypothesis”. 
                                                             
9 Alfon et al. (2004), Ayuso et al. (2004) and Jokipii and Milne (2008) document a negative association 
between capital and past values of the return on equity. In this strand of literature the return on equity is 
used as an indicator of bank’s cost of raising equity capital. However, in this study and consistent with 
Berger (1995), Nier and Baumann (2006) and Flannery and Rangan (2008) the return on equity is used 
as an indicator of firm profitability. 
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Next, Models (5) – (6) report the impact of bank efficiency on buffer when we include 
additional measures of performance. Models (5) – (7) employ both EFF and one of the 
other accounting performance measures (ROE, ROA and NIM) in the regressions. 
Estimated results suggest that even when we account for other accounting performance 
measures, bank efficiency exerts a positive and at least at 5% level significant impact 
on the capital buffer. These findings imply that the inclusion of other performance 
measure does not affect our regression results. 
[Insert Table 7] 
5.2.Threshold estimations  
5.2.1. The capital buffer and  efficiency nexus  
Our sample for threshold estimation consists of 1,735 observations for 314 banks over 
the period 2005-2013. The results for the empirical relationship between buffer and 
efficiency are presented in Table 8. We find a threshold variable of 0.729 for bank 
efficiency. This threshold value splits our sample into two regimes. The low regime 
includes 468 banks with efficiency scores less than 0.729. The estimated coefficient tB 
indicates that for banks that fall in the low efficiency regime, efficiency exerts a positive 
impact on buffer at 1% level. This result suggests that for the relatively less efficient 
banks, an increase in efficiency enhances bank capital buffer. The high regime consists 
from 1267 banks with efficiency scores greater than the threshold value. The negative 
sign of the estimated coefficient tC implies that for banks in the high regime, efficiency 
has a negative impact on buffer at 5% level. 
A striking result of this analysis is that the relationship between buffer and efficiency is 
characterized by a structural breakpoint, indicating that the impact of efficiency on 
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capital buffer depends on the level of bank’s efficiency. The positive coefficient for 
banks falling in the low regime suggests that the relatively less efficient banks use their 
increased efficiency to accumulate higher capital buffer. This finding confirms 
hypothesis H2 and is in line with the “franchise-value hypothesis”. According to this 
theory, banks that are more efficient tend to hold a higher capital to protect their future 
income derived from high efficiency (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 2006). Conversely, 
the negative coefficient for the relatively more efficient banks provides evidence in 
favour of the “efficiency-risk hypothesis” suggesting that a higher level of efficiency 
might substitute to capital against unexpected losses (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 
2006).  These findings are in agreement with Altunbas et al. (2007), Berger and 
Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) who document a negative 
relationship between capital and efficiency. Furthermore, our results are similar to 
Ayuso et al. (2004) and Jokipii and Milne (2008) who find an inverse relationship 
between bank performance and capital buffer.  
Overall, this study complements prior literature on the association between bank capital 
buffer and efficiency documenting a breakpoint in the underlying relationship. We show 
that for the relatively less efficient banks (low regime) the capital buffer choice 
dominates over the substitution effect, suggesting that relatively less efficient banks 
choose to maintain more capital buffer to protect their franchise value. In contrast, for 
the relatively more efficient banks (high regime), the substitution effect dominates over 
the capital buffer choice as an increasing efficiency may substitute for capital in 
protecting the firm from financial distress. 
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In line with the results obtained from the dynamic panel regressions in Table 7, the 
coefficient of the lagged value of capital buffer (Lag Buffer) is positive at 1% level, 
confirming hypothesis H1. Furthermore, Altman’s Z-Score carries a positive and at 1% 
significant level coefficient suggesting that banks with a lower risk of default 
accumulate greater capital buffer. RWA exerts a negative impact on buffer at 1% level 
indicating that banks with a greater portfolio of risk-weighted assets face difficulty in 
increasing their capital above the minimum requirements. The negative relationship 
between buffer and RWA also suggests that banks are forced to increase their capital 
buffer by reducing their risk-weighted assets (Shim 2013). Finally, the positive impact 
of bank size on capital buffer suggests that larger banks might hold higher buffer as a 
sign of solvency due to their easier access to capital markets.  
[Insert Table 8] 
Table 9 presents the evolution of banks in low and high regimes for the period 2005 –
2013. One can notice a negative trend in the percentage of banks with relatively higher 
efficiency scores for the years 2006 - 2008 (90% in 2005 decreases to 88% in 2006 to 
82% in 2007 and 65% in 2008). Although, for the years 2009 – 2010 there is a 
significant recovery in the number of banks that fall in the high efficiency regime (from 
65% in 2008 to 75% in 2009 and 80% in 2010), the trend in the following years is 
negative. These results are supported by the impact of the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008 
on the banking sector. The reduction in the number of banks with efficiency above the 
threshold value mirrors the deteriorating performance of banks during the crisis. 
[Insert Table 9] 
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In a further analysis, we account for the impact of the capital buffer on bank efficiency. 
Therefore, we employ the threshold methodology using the buffer as a threshold 
variable and the efficiency as a dependent variable. The impact of the buffer on 
efficiency is presented in Table 10. The estimated buffer threshold is 13.594. The low 
regime consists of 1,273 banks with relatively low capital buffer while the high regime 
consists of 462 banks. The coefficient tC for banks in the high regime is significant at 
5% level. Our findings could be compared with those of Fiordelisi et al. (2011) who 
find that an increase in bank capital leads to an efficiency improvement and with and 
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) who show that better capitalized banks exhibit higher level 
of efficiency than less-capitalized banks. 
Furthermore, the negative and significant at 1% level coefficient of Altman’s Z-Score 
may suggest that banks with a lower risk of default do not consider that much cost 
efficiency leading to lower efficiency scores. RWA exerts a negative impact on 
efficiency at 1% level. The impact of bank size on efficiency is negative implying that 
bank efficiency decreases as bank size increases.10 
[Insert Table 10] 
The evolution of banks in the low and high regimes over the sample period is presented 
in Table 11. It is obvious that the percentage of banks classified in low regime is 
consistently above the percentage of banks in the high regime. Table 11 shows a 
negative trend in the percentage of banks with high capital buffer for the years between 
2006 and 2008 (27% in 2006 to 21% in 2007 and 23% in 2008). These results could be 
                                                             
10 This finding is supported by Stiroh and Rumble (2006) who show that size is negatively correlated with 
efficiency for both domestic and foreign banks. The authors explain this relation through the agency costs, 
bureaucratic processes and other costs of managing extremely large institutions. 
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explained by the high cost of raising capital during distress (Campbell 1979). Our 
findings suggest that the ability of banks to accumulate regulatory capital over the 
minimum requirement has deteriorated due to the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008.  
[Insert Table 11] 
5.2.2. The capital buffer and Altman’s Z-Score nexus 
We further examine the relationship between bank capital buffer and risk of default as 
measured by the Altman’s Z-Score. High values of Altman’s Z-Score indicate more 
stable banks and thus, lower risk of default. Table 12 presents threshold estimation 
results using the buffer as the dependent variable and Altman’s Z-Score as the threshold 
regime variable. The threshold value for the Altman’s Z-Score is 7.382. This value splits 
our sample into the low regime, which consists of banks with relatively greater risk of 
default, and the high regime consisting of more stable banks. The coefficient tB  is 
positive and significant at 1% level while the impact of Altman’s Z-Score on capital 
buffer is insignificant for banks in the high regime. These results are in line with those 
obtained by the dynamic panel regressions in Table 7, indicating that banks with 
relatively lower Altman’s Z-Score and therefore, a higher risk of default, will choose to 
hold a higher capital buffer. Our findings provide evidence for the “regulatory 
hypothesis” according to which regulators encourage banks with a higher risk exposure 
to hold a higher capital buffer.  
Concerning the impact of the other bank-specific variables on buffer, the estimated 
results in Table 12 are in line with those of Table 8 where the threshold variable was 
the efficiency. The lagged value of buffer, efficiency, non-performing loans and bank 
size exert a positive impact on capital buffer. Finally, RWA carries a negative and 1% 
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significant sign, suggesting that a greater portfolio of risky assets curbs bank’s ability 
to accumulate capital above the minimum requirements.  
[Insert Table 12] 
The evolution of banks in low and high regimes over time is presented in Table 13. The 
percentage of banks in the low regime is above the percentage of banks in the high 
regime. These results could mirror the negative impact of the financial crisis of 2007 – 
2008 showing that over this period at least the 70% of the banks in our sample are 
characterized with relatively greater likelihood of default. 
[Insert Table 13] 
To examine the impact of capital buffer on bank default risk, we employ the threshold 
methodology using Altman’s Z-Score as the dependent variable and buffer as the 
threshold regime variable. Table 14 presents the estimated results. The threshold value 
of capital buffer is 9.244 and splits our sample in the low regime that consists of banks 
with relatively low buffer and the high regime with the relatively well-capitalised banks. 
Both regime-dependent coefficients (	tB	and		tC)	of buffer are positive and significant 
at 10% and 1% level respectively.  
These findings show that an increase in buffer increases Altman’s Z-Score and therefore, 
decreases the risk of default. Our results are in line with Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) 
and Guidara et al. (2013) who find that better-capitalized banks tend to have lower risk 
exposure. More importantly, these results suggest that the greater the minimum capital 
requirement, the weaker the incentives for banks to engage in risky activities leading to 
a lower risk of default. Therefore, these results support that the implementation of 
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minimum capital requirements by Basel Committee, has succeeded in its main aim of 
enhancing bank stability. 
[Insert Table 14] 
Finally, Table 15 shows that the percentage of the relatively well-capitalised banks is 
above that of the relatively low capitalized. After the year 2007, there is a negative trend 
(90% in 2005 to 85% in 2007). This might be due to the costly capital during the crisis 
of 2007 – 2008 that renders difficult for banks to increase their regulatory capital.  
[Insert Table 15] 
6. Sensitivity analysis: A panel-VAR model 
As part of sensitivity analysis that takes into account possible endogeneity among the 
main variables of our modelling, we employ a panel-VAR model where all main 
variables (i.e. except control variables) enter a system of equations as endogenous. Such 
model would facilitate the identification of causality directions between the main 
variables in a dynamic way. As a first step, we need to decide the optimal lag order j of 
the variables. We seek for the optimal lag order following Lutkepohl (2006). We also 
apply the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Arellano-Bond AR tests. The 
optimal lag identified is equal to one. Sargan test reports for lag equals to one the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. 11  Therefore, we employ a panel-data autoregression 
methodology by using a first order 3x3 panel-VAR model following Love and Zicchino 
(2006) 12: 
                                                             
11 Results are available upon request. Note that the ordering of variables could also be of importance. We 
test for the reverse ordering and results remain similar. Results are available under request. 
12 Note that without loss of generality we could estimate a panel VAR 4x4, and so on. 
32 
  
 
 
,  i =1,…, N, t=1,…,T.                                                           (8) 
Where Xit is a vector of three main variables of this analysis that is the bank capital 
buffer, bank efficiency and Altman’s Z-Score. Thus, Φ indicates a matrix of coefficients 
(3x3), whilst µi a vector of bank-specific effects and ei,t iid residuals. For estimation 
purposes, to account for endogeneity we follow Love and Zicchino (2006) employing 
the Arellano-Bond system-based GMM estimator. Essentially, the panel-VAR is a 
system of the following equations: 
 \]44#% = 	 AB? +	∑ ABB\]44#%^D +{D|B 	∑ ABC344#%^D +{D|B 	∑ ABVNO!PN+,#%^D +{D|B 	nB#,%                                         344#% = 	 AC? +	∑ ACB\]44#%^D +{D|B 	∑ ACC344#%^D +{D|B 	∑ ACVNO!PN+,#%^D +{D|B 	nC#,%                                         NO!PN+,#% = 	AV? +	∑ AVB\]44#%^D +{D|B 	∑ AVC344#%^D +{D|B 	∑ AVVNO!PN+,#%^D +{D|B 	nV#,%         
(9) 
The above system of equations has a moving average (MA) representation as a function 
of a set of present and past residuals e1, e2, and e3. Given possible endogeneity, these 
equations could be correlated and thereby the coefficients of the MA representation are 
not meaningful. A way to have meaningful estimations is to orthogonalise the residuals 
opting for the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix. In addition, we 
introduce fixed effects to ensure heterogeneity in the levels.13  
6.1.1.  Panel Impulse response functions (IRFs) 
                                                             
13 Following Love and Zicchino (2006) we apply the Helmert procedure in the data set. That is the data 
we are forward mean differenced.  
tiitiit e ,1 +F+= -XX µ
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Figure 4 presents impulse-response functions (IRFs) and the 5% error banks generated 
by Monte Carlo simulation for a panel VAR of the following ordering of variables 
Altman’s Z-Score (ALTMANZ), bank efficiency (EFF) and capital buffer (BFF).14 
[Insert Figure 4] 
From the first row of Figure 4, the last plot shows that the effect of one standard 
deviation shock of Altman’s Z-Score on the buffer is positive, while this effect becomes 
less pronounced after the fourth year. This result is in line with the main results in Tables 
6 and 7 providing further support for the “franchise-value hypothesis”. According to 
this hypothesis, banks with a lower risk of default have higher charter value (Jokipii and 
Milne 2011) and will sustain their value by holding a higher capital buffer.  
Next, one can notice from the second row, last plot that the response of the capital buffer 
to one standard deviation shock of efficiency is positive as well. It picks after the first 
two periods and converges to the equilibrium thereafter. These results are in line with 
our main results obtained in Tables 6 and 7. Thus, the “franchise-value hypothesis” 
dominates over the “efficiency-risk hypothesis” indicating that banks with higher 
efficiency choose to hold a higher buffer to protect their charter value and future 
earnings. 
In the case of Altman’s Z-score, the panel-VAR methodology appears to confirm the 
findings of Table 14 (see Figure 4, the first plot in the last row that reports the response 
of Altman’s Z-Score to one standard deviation shock of buffer). The response is positive 
                                                             
14 As the ordering of variables in the panel VAR is not without significance we also estimate the system 
of equations, opting for the reverse ordering of variables. Results remain are available under request and 
confirm the present findings.  
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across the whole period and in agreement with the positive coefficients λ1 and λ2 of both 
regimes in Table 14. Thus, the panel-VAR results show that a higher capital buffer 
enhances bank stability by reducing the risk of default (increasing Altman’s Z-Score).  
Finally, the second plot in the third row of Figure 4 shows that the effect of one standard 
deviation shock of buffer on efficiency is negative and it converges towards the 
equilibrium after the first period. This finding comes in contrast with our previous 
results in Table 10. However, this result needs to be interpreted with some caution as 
the response crosses the zero line and might imply a loss of significance.  
Next, we present VDCs, which show the percent of the variation in one variable that is 
explained by the shock to another variable, accumulated over time. The variance 
decompositions show the magnitude of the total effect. We report the total effect 
accumulated over 10 years. Longer time horizons produced equivalent results. Table 16 
presents the VDCs estimations. These results come in agreement with those reported by 
the IRFs, and provide further evidence that the level of efficiency explains the variation 
of buffer, though mostly it is buffer itself that explains its variation. Particularly, 3.43% 
of the forecast error of capital buffer after ten years is explained by shocks in the EFF 
variable. Furthermore, the VDCs results show that the level of buffer explains almost 
the half (50.8%) of the variation of efficiency. Finally, both capital buffer and efficiency 
are significant determinants of bank’s risk of default. Around 17.75% of the forecast 
error variance of ALTMANZ after 10 years is captured by BFF disturbances and about 
26.33% by EFF disturbances.  
[Insert Table 16] 
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7. Conclusion  
This study empirically addresses the association between bank capital buffer, 
performance and risk. Using a sample of EU-27 banks over the period between 2004 
and 2013, the findings of this study could be of interest to both supervisory authorities 
and bank managers. Given that our sample covers the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008, 
we employ the dynamic panel threshold methodology as developed by Kremer et al. 
(2013). Results show different regimes over the sample period. A strong positive impact 
of bank performance on the capital buffer is reported for banks in the low performance 
regime, while for the relatively better performing banks an improvement in the 
performance decreases the capital buffer. Moreover, threshold results indicate a positive 
impact of buffer on bank performance. These findings provide evidence that the 
regulatory framework as regards the capital adequacy requirements can enhance bank 
performance. Furthermore, threshold analysis shows that capital buffer exerts a strong 
positive impact on bank stability. The positive relationship between buffer and Altman’s 
Z-Score suggests that the implementation of minimum capital requirements might have 
succeeded in its main aim of creating a more stable banking system and reducing banks’ 
default risk.  
Notably, we find changes in the percentage of banks in each threshold regime during 
and after the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008. There is an increasing trend in the 
percentage of banks in the low performance regime over time, especially after the years 
2007 – 2008. This finding indicates that banks in the EU-27 region experienced a period 
of substantial performance deterioration. Moreover, the number of banks in the low 
capital buffer regime is consistently above the number of banks in the high regime 
during the financial crisis. Given the high cost of raising capital during the economic 
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downturn, EU-27 banks accumulate lower capital during the recession period. These 
results are of some value for managers and policy makers in particular. Our findings 
clearly indicate that the impact of capital requirements is different for banks with 
different performance and risk characteristics.   
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Appendix 
Table I: Variable definitions and data sources. 
Variables Definition Source 
Bank-specific 
variables 
    
Buffer (BUFF) The amount of capital banks hold in excess of the 
minimum requirement and iscalculated as 
regulatory capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 over Risk 
Weighted Assets) minus minimum capital 
requirement. 
BankScope 
Cost Efficiency 
(EFF) 
A measure of bank performance. This variable 
indicates how close a firm’s profits are to the 
benchmark of the best practice firm. The measure 
of EFF is given by the ratio of minimum cost to 
actual cost and is bounded between zero and 
unity. We employ Stochastic Frontier Analysis in 
order to estimate cost efficiency for each bank. 
SFA  
ROE Return on equity. This variable is defined as the 
ratio of net profits over equity (%). 
BankScope 
ROA Return on assets. This variable is defined as the 
ratio of net profits over total assets (%). 
BankScope 
NIM Net interest margin. This variable is defined as the 
ratio of net interest income over total assets. 
BankScope 
Non-performing 
loans (NPL) 
The ratio of non-performing loans over total 
loans. 
BankScope 
Risk-Weighted 
Assets (RWA) 
The ratio of bank risk-weighted assets over total 
assets.  
BankScope 
Off-Balance-
Sheet items 
(OBS) 
Measured as the non-interest income and fee 
generating services from various contingent 
liabilities such as letters of credit, derivatives, 
securities underwriting, insurance and other types 
of non-traditional banking activities. 
BankScope 
Altman’s Z-Score 
(ALTMANZ) 
Altman’s Z-Score shows bank likelihood of 
bankruptcy and is calculated based on the 
following formula: NO!PN+, = 1.2SB +1.4SC + 3.3SV + 0.64SY + 0.999SY. 
 
Z-Score (Z-
SCORE) 
Z-Score indicates the risk of failure for a bank and 
is measured according to the following formula: 
Z-Score = (1 + ROE) / Standard Deviation of 
ROE and indicates the probability of failure for a 
given bank. 
BankScope 
Bank size (SIZE) The natural log of total assets is used as a measure 
of bank size. 
BankScope 
Disclosure 
(DISCLSR) 
A dummy variable that takes the value 1 for listed 
banks and 0 unlisted indicating information 
disclosure.  
BankScope 
Commercial 
banks (COM) 
A Dummy taking the value 1 for commercial 
banks and 0 for saving banks. 
BankScope 
Country-specific 
variables 
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GDP growth 
(GDPGR) 
GDP growth of each country. World 
Development 
Indicators 
(WDI) 
Concentration 
ratio (C5) 
The concentration ratio (C5) in the banking 
industry measured by the sum of the assets of the 
five largest banks as a share of all banks in each 
country and for each year. 
BankScope 
European 
Monetary Union 
countries (EMU)  
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 
European Monetary Union countries and 0 
otherwise. 
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List of tables 
 
Table 1: Total regulatory capital across country for EU-27 (2004 - 2013) 
Total regulatory capital across country for EU-27, (2004 - 2013).     
Country Mean Max Min Country Mean Max Min 
AUSTRIA 25.97 190 9.19 LATVIA 16.11 80.29 8.02 
BELGIUM 16.5 43.81 8.87 LITHUANIA 14.1 29.6 8.95 
BULGARIA 16.23 40.15 10.2 LUXEMBOURG 21.65 111.7 8.68 
CROATIA 17.59 38.67 9.17 MALTA 16.24 44.86 8.06 
CYPRUS 14.27 47.34 8.2 NETHERLANDS 16.48 45.9 9.3 
CZECH REPUBLIC 18.08 108.15 9.11 POLAND 13.84 33.64 8.63 
DENMARK 17.77 132.3 8.3 PORTUGAL 14.97 79.8 8.4 
ESTONIA 19.58 32.5 10.54 ROMANIA 18.41 122.63 9.77 
FINLAND 16.79 26.75 10.6 SLOVAKIA 15.31 30.38 9.05 
FRANCE 12.79 57 8.87 SLOVENIA 13.49 51.3 8.06 
GERMANY 18 95.7 8.1 SPAIN 15.88 71.9 8.17 
GREECE 13.74 36.6 8.51 SWEDEN 18.16 44.96 1.04 
HUNGARY 13.05 22.13 8.89 UNITED KINGDOM 18.07 102.9 9.7 
IRELAND 12.83 25 8.3 Mean 17.17 190 1.04 
ITALY 15.95 187 7.8     
Note: The table reports the mean total regulatory capital for EU-27 countries. The total regulatory capital 
is calculated as the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital over Risk Weighted Assets. 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean total regulatory capital for EU-27 countries over the years 2004-2013. The 
total regulatory capital is calculated as the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital over Risk Weighted 
Assets. 
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Table 2:  National total regulatory capital requirements 
 Minimum capital 
requirement 
Year of 
Implementation 
UK 9% 1979 
Cyprus 8% 1997 
 10% 2001 
Estonia 10% 1997 
Latvia 10% 1997 
 8% 2004 
Lithuania 10% 1997 
 8% 2005 
Note: The table shows the minimum capital requirements for countries 
that had set different minimum ratio over time. The minimum capital 
requirements for all other EU-27 countries is calculated with 8% of 
Risk Weighted Assets according to Jokipii and Milne (2008). 
 
Table 3: Bank capital buffer across country for EU-27 (2004 - 2013) 
Bank capital buffer across country for EU-27, (2004 - 2013).     
Country Mean Max Min Country Mean Max Min 
AUSTRIA 14.59 15.7 13.12 LATVIA 11.53 16.54 4.79 
BELGIUM 15.35 17.25 13.01 LITHUANIA 11.91 16.54 7.35 
BULGARIA 11.28 17.02 8.44 LUXEMBOURG 13.82 15.22 11.5 
CROATIA 10.92 14.11 6.09 MALTA 11.3 12.91 10.4 
CYPRUS 11.03 14.43 6.23 NETHERLANDS 13.05 17.02 10.9 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 12.34 14.94 9.03 POLAND 12.48 15.35 9.66 
DENMARK 11.41 16.54 7.72 PORTUGAL 14.54 17.72 9.22 
ESTONIA 12.28 14.06 8.8 ROMANIA 11.68 13.95 8.73 
FINLAND 13.4 15.88 10.53 SLOVAKIA 11.57 13.62 9.63 
FRANCE 14.45 17.53 11.18 SLOVENIA 11.07 13.24 8.81 
GERMANY 10.89 17.25 6.34 SPAIN 13.67 16.44 9.46 
GREECE 12.42 15.17 9.01 SWEDEN 10.98 15.35 6.29 
HUNGARY 12.56 14.92 8.36 UNITED KINGDOM 13.92 17.72 9.06 
IRELAND 14.01 17.53 9.82 Mean 11.75 17.72 4.61 
ITALY 11.12 17.13 4.61     
Note: The table reports the mean bank capital buffer for EU-27 countries. The bank capital 
buffer is calculated as the natural logarithm of total regulatory capital minus minimum capital 
requirement, where total regulatory capital is the sum of Tier 1 plus Tier 2 over Risk 
Weighted Assets. 
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Figure 2: Mean capital buffer for EU-27 countries over the years 2004-2013. The bank capital 
buffer is calculated as the natural logarithm of total regulatory capital minus minimum capital 
requirement, where total regulatory capital  is the sum of Tier 1 plus Tier 2 over Risk Weighted 
Assets. 
 
Table 4: Bank cost efficiency estimates across country for EU-27 (2004 - 2013) 
Bank cost efficiency estimates across country for EU-27, (2004 - 2013).   
Country Mean Max Min Country Mean Max Min 
AUSTRIA 0.78 0.88 0.7 LATVIA 0.77 0.94 0.59 
BELGIUM 0.7 0.86 0.4 LITHUANIA 0.76 0.87 0.55 
BULGARIA 0.64 0.82 0.42 LUXEMBOURG 0.72 0.84 0.52 
CROATIA 0.66 0.79 0.48 MALTA 0.85 0.92 0.78 
CYPRUS 0.76 0.93 0.44 NETHERLANDS 0.73 0.86 0.5 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 0.8 0.95 0.57 POLAND 0.73 0.9 0.52 
DENMARK 0.8 0.9 0.61 PORTUGAL 0.72 0.89 0.43 
ESTONIA 0.78 0.94 0.55 ROMANIA 0.63 0.78 0.46 
FINLAND 0.79 0.95 0.48 SLOVAKIA 0.78 0.86 0.57 
FRANCE 0.76 0.92 0.42 SLOVENIA 0.78 0.88 0.57 
GERMANY 0.8 0.89 0.29 SPAIN 0.84 0.97 0.43 
GREECE 0.75 0.91 0.52 SWEDEN 0.83 0.98 0.46 
HUNGARY 0.63 0.75 0.45 UNITED KINGDOM 0.79 0.96 0.47 
IRELAND 0.79 0.91 0.62 Mean 0.78 0.98 0.29 
ITALY 0.82 0.95 0.48     
Note: The table reports the mean cost efficiency for EU-27 countries. The bank cost 
efficiency scores are estimated employing Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).  
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Figure 3: Bank cost efficiency estimates over the years 2004-2013. The bank cost efficiency 
scores are estimated employing Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for variables  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BUFF 11.75 2.14 4.61 17.72 
EFF 0.78 0.09 0.29 0.98 
ROE 4.27 21.36 -135 146 
ROA 0.39 1.70 -29.86 77.81 
NIM 2.57 1.79 -36.27 34.689 
NPL 0.06 0.8 -0.04 0.92 
RWA 5.46 0.87 0.002 40 
OBS 0.15 0.49 -0.04 19.72 
ALTMANZ 7.16 16.86 -1.25 50 
ZSCORE 2.49 4.44 -4.56 55.07 
SIZE 15.13 2.36 9.40 21.51 
GDPGR 0.65 3.21 -17.95 12.23 
C5 0.82 0.10 0.49 1 
Note: BUFF is the capital buffer calculated as the regulatory capital (Tier 1 plus 
Tier 2 over Risk Weighted Assets) minus minimum capital requirement. EFF 
stands for performance measure and is derived from SFA. ROE, ROA and NIM 
stand for additional bank performance measures and are the ratios of return on 
equity, return on assets and net interest margin respectively. NPL stands for the 
ratio of non-performing loans over total loans, RWA is calculated as the ratio 
of risk-weighted assets over total assets, OBS stands for the Off-Balance-Sheet 
items measured as the ratio of Off-Balance-Sheet items over total liabilities, 
ALTMANZ stands for Altman’s Z-Score: N,_"`a3 = 1.2SB + 1.4SC +3.3SV + 0.64SY + 0.999SYand ZSCORE presents bank’s distance from default 
calculated from the formula: ZSCORE = (1 + ROE) / Standard Deviation of 
ROE. SIZE is the log of total assets and measures the bank size. GDPGR stands 
for the GDP growth, while C5 stands for the five-firm concentration ratio of 
each country’s banking industry. 
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Table 6: Dynamic Panel results for bank capital buffer using efficiency as performance measure (2004 – 2013) 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
         
L.BFF 0.812*** 0.756*** 0.440*** 0.561*** 0.410*** 0.580*** 0.518*** 0.428*** 
 (0.048) (0.066) (0.078) (0.058) (0.066) (0.054) (0.060) (0.060) 
EFF  4.105*** 1.967** 1.425** 1.778** 0.896 1.641*** 0.530** 
  (1.491) (0.951) (0.573) (0.879) (0.743) (0.602) (0.298) 
ALTMANZ   0.057**     0. 045*** 
   (0.026)     (0.015) 
ZSCORE    0.005     
    (0.019)     
NPL     0.003   0.003 
     (0.004)   (0.003) 
OBS      0.063*  0.031* 
      (0.035)  (0.017) 
RWA       0.331 0.094 
       (0.221) (0.112) 
DISCLOSURE   0.146 -0.044 0.246 0.221 -0.542 0.196 
   (0.509) (0.293) (0.336) (0.262) (0.397) (0.149) 
SIZE   0.507*** 0.401*** 0.562*** 0.343*** 0.442*** 0.562*** 
   (0.105) (0.066) (0.077) (0.063) (0.075) (0.061) 
COM   0.042 0.062 -0.082 0.038 0.246** 0.248** 
   (0.141) (0.063) (0.122) (0.099) (0.101) (0.111) 
C5   -0.210 0.135 0.007 0.085 0.149 -0.076 
   (0.279) (0.194) (0.242) (0.171) (0.232) (0.211) 
GDPGR   0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.010 0.003 0.011 
   (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
EMU   -0.129 -0.217*** -0.249*** -0.120** -0.274*** -0.145** 
   (0.114) (0.076) (0.079) (0.048) (0.094) (0.042) 
Constant 2.112*** -0.132 -2.631*** -1.842*** -2.693*** -1.111* -1.529*** -2.395*** 
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VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
         
 (0.510) (1.016) (1.019) (0.697) (0.909) (0.649) (0.452) (0.514) 
         
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hansen test 0.0107 0.0812 0.411 0.0701 0.384 0.270 0.380 0.072 
AR(2) 1.836 1.551 1.774 1.717 1.365 1.402 1.671 1.187 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results. The two-step GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995) is used with Windmeijer corrected (robust) 
errors. We consider as exogenous the country-specific and time dummy variables and as endogenous the bank-specific variables. The instruments chosen 
for the lagged endogenous variables are two-to-six period lags. AR (2) stands for the p-value of the second order residual autocorrelation tests. Hansen 
test stands for the p-value of Hansen’s J diagnostic test for instrument validity. The dependent variable is the capital buffer (BUFF) calculated as the 
regulatory capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 over Risk Weighted Assets) minus minimum capital requirement. L.BUFF is the lagged value of the dependent 
variable BUFF representing the dynamic nature of the model.  EFF stands or the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA methodology. ALTMANZ 
presents Altman’s Z-Score and is a measure of bank likelihood for default. ZSCORE presents bank’s distance from default calculated from the formula: 
ZSCORE = (1 + ROE) / Standard Deviation of ROE. NPL stands for the ratio of  non-performing loan over total loans,  OBS stands for the Off-Balance-
Sheet items measured as the ratio of Off-Balance-Sheet items over total liabilities. RWA stands for the bank risk exposure and is calculated as the ratio 
of risk-weighted assets over total assets, DISCLSR is a dummy taking the value 1 for listed banks and 0 unlisted and stands as a second measure of 
market discipline indicating information disclosure. SIZE is the log of total assets and measures the bank size while C5 stands for the five-firm 
concentration ratio of each country’s banking industry. GDPGR stands for the GDP growth, EMU is a dummy taking the value 1 for banks in Eurozone 
and 0 otherwise and COM is a dummy taking the value 1 for commercial banks and 0 for saving banks. 
***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
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Table 7: Dynamic Panel results for bank capital buffer using different performance measures (2004 – 2013) 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
        
L.BFF 0.404*** 0.428*** 0.422*** 0.406*** 0.420*** 0.422*** 0.394*** 
 (0.054) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
EFF 0.699**    0.598** 0.751*** 0.901*** 
 (0.277)    (0.287) (0.285) (0.322) 
ROE  0.003***   0.003***   
  (0.001)   (0.001)   
ROA   0.050   0.060**  
   (0.031)   (0.027)  
NIM    0.050*   0.090*** 
    (0.028)   (0.029) 
ALTMANZ 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.051*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) 
NPL 0.006 0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.008* 0.009* 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
OBS 0.047** 0.024 0.022 0.034** 0.038* 0.037* 0.051** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
RWA 0.065 0.115 0.059 0.020 0.077 0.077 -0.005 
 (0.121) (0.150) (0.176) (0.078) (0.122) (0.164) (0.068) 
DISCLOSURE 0.210 0.008 0.057 0.054 0.161 0.199 0.168 
 (0.154) (0.164) (0.164) (0.156) (0.148) (0.159) (0.146) 
SIZE 0.583*** 0.586*** 0.580*** 0.606*** 0.580*** 0.572*** 0.620*** 
 (0.058) (0.067) (0.069) (0.064) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) 
COM -0.289** -0.329** -0.252* -0.282* -0.374*** -0.340*** -0.344*** 
 (0.115) (0.137) (0.132) (0.145) (0.122) (0.128) (0.125) 
C5 -0.068 -0.033 -0.103 -0.041 -0.028 -0.080 -0.007 
 (0.163) (0.147) (0.153) (0.148) (0.162) (0.170) (0.172) 
GDPGR 0.010* 0.010* 0.011* 0.011** 0.007 0.006 0.006 
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VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
        
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
EMU -0.174*** -0.149*** -0.111* -0.104* -0.188*** -0.166*** -0.142*** 
 (0.053) (0.057) (0.061) (0.056) (0.059) (0.059) (0.051) 
Constant -2.275*** -2.080*** -1.942*** -2.278*** -2.330*** -2.371*** -3.127*** 
 (0.469) (0.488) (0.498) (0.461) (0.469) (0.502) (0.573) 
        
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hansen test 0.188 0.340 0.238 0.523 0.143 0.144 0.383 
AR(2) 1.291 1.365 1.378 1.355 1.334 1.363 1.290 
 Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results. The two-step GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995) is used with Windmeijer 
corrected (robust) errors. We consider as exogenous the country-specific and time dummy variables and as endogenous the bank-specific 
variables. The instruments chosen for the lagged endogenous variables are two-to-six period lags. AR (2) stands for the p-value of the 
second order residual autocorrelation tests. Hansen test stands for the p-value of Hansen’s J diagnostic test for instrument validity. The 
dependent variable is the capital buffer (BUFF) calculated as the regulatory capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 over Risk Weighted Assets) minus 
minimum capital requirement. L.BUFF is the lagged value of the dependent variable BUFF representing the dynamic nature of the model.  
EFF stands or the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA methodology. ROE is the return on equity ratio, ROA the return on assets 
while NIM is the net interest margin. ALTMANZ presents Altman’s Z-Score and is a measure of bank likelihood for default. NPL stands 
for the ratio of  non-performing loan over total loans,  OBS stands for the Off-Balance-Sheet items measured as the ratio of Off-Balance-
Sheet items over total liabilities. RWA stands for the bank risk exposure and is calculated as the ratio of risk-weighted assets over total 
assets, DISCLSR is a dummy taking the value 1 for listed banks and 0 unlisted and stands as a second measure of market discipline 
indicating information disclosure. SIZE is the log of total assets and measures the bank size while C5 stands for the five-firm 
concentration ratio of each country’s banking industry. GDPGR stands for the GDP growth, EMU is a dummy taking the value 1 for 
banks in Eurozone and 0 otherwise and COM is a dummy taking the value 1 for commercial banks and 0 for saving banks. 
***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
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Table 8: Results for dynamic panel threshold estimation with efficiency as 
threshold variable and buffer as dependent variable (2005 – 2013) 
EFF 0.729     
95% confidence interval          (0.569 - 0.848) 
  Coefficient  S.E. 
Impact of Eff on Buffer       
λ1 1.652 *** 0.55 
λ2 -1.20 ** 0.462 
Impact of covariates       
Lag Buffer 0.222 *** 0.035 
Altman’s z-score 0.098 *** 0.018 
Non-performing loans 0.005  0.004 
Off-Balance-Sheet items 0.034 * 0.019 
RWA -0.619 *** 0.254 
Size 1.584 *** 0.308 
C5 -0.029  0.230 
GDP growth -0.012 *** 0.004 
Time Dummies Yes   
δ  -0.222   0.513 
Observations 1735  
 
Low Regime 468  
 
High Regime 1267     
Note:  The table reports the estimation for dynamic panel threshold model. The 
threshold value of efficiency variable for banks ranges between 0.569 and 0.848. 
We denote bank capital buffer (BUFF) as the dependent variable while as the 
threshold variable we impose bank cost efficiency (EFF) and as the regime 
dependent variable bank size. The model accounts for regime dependent 
intercepts (δ). In this model, mit, includes bank-specific and country explanatory 
variables. As regards the bank-specific variables, we use: lagged capital buffer 
(Lag Buffer), Altman’s Z-Score, non-performing loans, off-balance-items, RWA 
and size. As country variables, we employ: GDP growth rate and concentration 
ratio (C5).  Finally, we include time dummies. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 
10% significance levels respectively.   
  
Table 9: Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of banks into low and high regimes based on threshold value 
of cost efficiency 
Threshold: Efficiency                 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Low Regime 10% 12% 18% 35% 25% 20% 24% 34% 34% 
High Regime 90% 88% 82% 65% 75% 80% 76% 66% 66% 
Note: The table shows the classification of banks based on the efficiency threshold value that we obtained 
following Kremer, Bick and Nautz (2013).  
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Table 10: Results for dynamic panel threshold estimation with buffer as 
threshold variable and efficiency as dependent variable (2005 – 2013) 
BUFF 13.594     
95% confidence interval         (9.458 - 13.855) 
  Coefficient  S.E. 
Impact of Buffer on Eff       
λ1 0.008  0.005 
λ2 0.018 ** 0.008 
Impact of covariates       
Lag Efficiency 0.004  0.003 
Altman’s Z-Score -0.006 *** 0.002 
Non-performing loans -0.0006  0.0004 
Off-Balance-Sheet items -0.004  0.004 
RWA -0.090 *** 0.029 
Size -0.196 *** 0.037 
C5 0.120 * 0.071 
GDP growth 0.001 *** 0.0005 
Time Dummies Yes   
Δ 0.122   0.104  
Observations 1735  
 
Low Regime 1273  
 
High Regime 462     
Note:  The table reports the estimation for dynamic panel threshold model. The 
threshold value of buffer variable for banks ranges between 9.822 and 13.754. 
We denote bank efficiency (EFF) as the dependent variable while as the threshold 
variable we impose the bank capital buffer (BUFF) and as the regime dependent 
variable bank size. The model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). In 
this model, mit, includes bank-specific and country explanatory variables. As 
regards the bank-specific variables, we use: Lagged efficiency (Lag Efficiency), 
Altman’s Z-Score, non-performing loans, off-balance-items, RWA and size.  As 
country variables, we employ: GDP growth rate and concentration ratio (C5).  
Finally, we include time dummies.  ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels respectively.   
 
Table 11: Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of banks into low and high regimes based on threshold value 
of buffer 
Threshold: Buffer                 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Low Regime 69% 73% 79% 77% 72% 71% 74% 72% 72% 
High Regime 31% 27% 21% 23% 28% 29% 26% 28% 28% 
Note: The table shows the classification of banks based on the buffer threshold value that we obtained following 
Kremer, Bick and Nautz (2013).  
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Table 12: Results for dynamic panel threshold estimation with Z-Score as 
threshold variable and Buffer as dependent variable (2005 – 2013) 
Altman’s Z-Score 7.382     
95% confidence interval (6.038  -  7.633) 
  Coefficient  S.E. 
Impact of Z-Score on Buffer       
λ1 0.228 *** 0.023 
λ2 0.011  0.008 
Impact of covariates       
Lag Buffer 0.197 *** 0.029 
Efficiency 1.009 *** 0.233 
Non-performing loans 0.004 ** 0.002 
Off-Balance-Sheet items 0.016  0.020 
RWA -0.823 *** 0.193 
Size 1.543 *** 0.219 
C5 -0.320  0.842 
GDP growth -0.013 *** 0.003 
Time Dummies YES   
Δ -1.584 *** 0.156 
Observations 1735  
 
Low Regime 1300  
 
High Regime 435     
Note:  The table reports the estimation for dynamic panel threshold model. The 
threshold value of Altman’s Z-Score variable for banks ranges between 6.038 and 
7.610. We denote bank capital buffer (BUFF) as the dependent variable while as 
the threshold variable we impose Altman´s Z-Score and as the regime dependent 
variable bank size.  The model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). In 
this model, mit, includes bank-specific and country explanatory variables. As 
regards the bank-specific variables, we use: lagged capital buffer (Lag Buffer), 
Efficiency, non-performing loans, off-balance-items, RWA and size. As country 
variables, we employ: GDP growth rate and concentration ratio (C5). Finally, we 
include time dummies. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively.   
 
Table 13: Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of banks into low and high regimes based on threshold value 
of Z-Score 
Threshold: Altman’s Z-Score            
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Low Regime 76% 84% 82% 85% 74% 73% 72% 71% 73% 
High Regime 24% 16% 18% 15% 26% 27% 28% 29% 27% 
Note: The table shows the classification of banks based on the Z-Score threshold value that we obtained 
following Kremer, Bick and Nautz (2013).  
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Table 14: Results for dynamic panel threshold estimation with Buffer as 
threshold variable and Altman’s Z-Score as dependent variable (2005 – 2013) 
BUFF 9.244     
95% confidence interval (9.167 - 13.492) 
  Coefficient  S.E. 
Impact of Buffer on  Z-Score        
λ1 0.760 * 0.407 
λ2 1.184 *** 0.269 
Impact of covariates       
Lag Altman’s Z-Score 0.036  0.024 
Efficiency 2.682  2.320 
Non-performing loans 0.020  0.022 
Off-Balance-Sheet items 0.118  0.234 
RWA -8.470 *** 2.50 
Size 4.672  3.643 
C5 0.038  1.154 
GDP growth 0.042  0.027 
Time Dummies Yes  
 
δ  5.023   4.022 
Observations 1735  
 
Low Regime 90  
 
High Regime 1645     
Note:  The table reports the estimation for dynamic panel threshold model. The 
threshold value of BUFF variable for banks ranges between 9.167 and 13.492. 
We denote Altman’s Z-Score as the dependent variable while as the threshold 
variable we impose capital buffer (BUFF) and as the regime dependent variable 
bank size.  The model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). In this model, 
mit, includes bank-specific and country explanatory variables. As regards the 
bank-specific variables, we use: lagged Altman’s Z-Score, Efficiency, non-
performing loans, off-balance-items, RWA and size. As country variables, we 
employ: GDP growth rate and concentration ratio (C5). Finally, we include time 
dummies. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
Table 15: Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of banks into low and high regimes based on threshold 
value of buffer 
Threshold: Buffer                 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Low Regime 10% 7% 15% 16% 15% 15% 17% 15% 13% 
High Regime 90% 93% 85% 84% 85% 85% 83% 85% 87% 
Note: The table shows the classification of banks based on the buffer threshold value that we obtained 
following Kremer, Bick and Nautz (2013). 
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions for bank capital buffer, Altman's Z-Score and 
efficiency 
 
Note: The figure presents Impulse Response Functions for: BFF which stands for the bank capital buffer, 
EFF which is bank efficiency and ALTMANZ is the Altman's Z-Scores. Finally, s is the number of time 
periods ahead. Dashed lines are 5% S.E. on each side generated by Monte Carlo with 500 replications. 
 
Table 16: Variance Decompositions for bank capital buffer, Altman's Z-
Score and efficiency 
Response variable  Impulse variables 
 s BFF EFF ALTMANZ 
BFF 10 0.96561 0.03433 0.0000596 
EFF 10 0.508 0.49163 0.0003685 
ALTMANZ 10 0.17755 0.2633 0.5591566 
Note: The table presents the Variance Decompositions for:  BFF which stands for the bank capital 
buffer, EFF which is bank efficiency and ALTMANZ presents the Altman's Z-Scores. Finally, s is 
the number of time periods ahead (years). 
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